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LIMITED JURISDICTION IN CALIFORNIA: THE
LONG-ARM OF THE LAW REACHES FARTHER IN
TORT THAN IN CONTRACT
INTRODUCTION
A state's exercise of in personam jurisdiction' over a non-
resident defendant may be based on one of two theories. First,
if the nonresident defendant's forum-state activities are wide-
ranging, continuous and systematic, the state may assume gen-
eral jurisdiction over him for all causes of action, regardless of
their relation to the defendant's forum-state activities.' Sec-
ond, if the nonresident defendant's contacts with the forum
state are not so extensive as to justify general jurisdiction, thenjurisdiction may be assumed only if the cause of action arises
directly from or is substantially connected with the defendant's
forum-state contacts.' This latter concept of limited jurisdic-
tion gives the courts more latitude to exercise personal jurisdic-
tion than does the concept of general jurisdiction. Thus, it
becomes important to examine the circumstances under which
California's courts have been willing to place a jurisdictional
dispute into the limited jurisdiction context.
California jurisdictional disputes are governed by a long-
arm statute which reaches to the limits of due process.' De-
spite the liberal reach of this statute, California courts de-
manded, until 1976, strict compliance with traditional juris-
dictional requirements. Then, in Cornelison v. Chaney,5 the
California Supreme 'Court abandoned these requirements and
adopted a flexible balancing approach to limited jurisdiction
in a wrongful death action. One month later in Sibley v. Supe-
rior Court,' the supreme court refused to exercise limitedjurisdiction over a Florida resident in a breach-of-guaranty
action, despite the defendant's significant forum-state con-
tacts related to the cause of action. 7
1. An action in personam is one directed against or with reference to a specific
person arising out of a legal obligation that person owes to another. BLACK's LAW
DICTIONARY 899 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
2. See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
3. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
4. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973) provides: "A court of this state may
exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state
or of the United States."
5. 16 Cal. 3d 143, 545 P.2d 264, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1976).
6. 16 Cal. 3d 442, 546 P.2d 322, 128 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1976).
7. Id. at 447, 546 P.2d at 325, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
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Though Sibley appeared to signal a retreat from
Cornelison, when the court again confronted the question of
whether or not to exercise limited jurisdiction, it liberally con-
strued both the law and the facts to greatly expand the scope
of limited jurisdiction. Thus, in Kulko v. Superior Court,' the
court upheld limited jurisdiction over a nonresident father in
a suit for increased child support, concluding that his action in
sending his daughter into California to live permanently with
her mother amounted to a purposeful availment of the benefits
and protections of California law.'
Initially, this comment provides an overview of the tradi-
tional jurisdictional principles enunciated by the United States
and California Supreme Courts. It then discusses and com-
pares the California appellate courts' treatment of jurisdic-
tional disputes in tort and contract cases prior to the recent
supreme court decisions, perceiving that the substantive differ-
ences between these classes of cases plays a large role in deter-
mining how a court will apply the traditional jurisdictional
principles.
Finally, this comment discusses the recent supreme court
decisions, observing that they reaffirm the pattern established
by the appellate courts. In assessing the constitutionality of
this pattern, this comment points to the need for California
courts to examine more closely the interests favoring or disfa-
voring the assertion of limited jurisdiction in order to ensure
due process of law for nonresident defendants.
DUE PROCESS BACKGROUND
Consistent with the flexibility inherent in the "fair play
and substantial justice" test of International Shoe v.
Washington, I" the 1969 California Legislature enacted a long-
arm statute as broad as the outermost limits of the federal and
state Constitutions." Additionally, an authoritative practice
8. 19 Cal. 3d 514, 564 P.2d 353, 138 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1977).
9. Id. at 524, 564 P.2d at 358, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
10. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The test provided that as a prerequisite to a state's
exercise of in personam jurisdiction, a nonresident defendant must have had certain
minimum contacts with the forum state. Whether due process was satisfied by the
amount of such contacts depended "upon the quality and nature of the [defendant's]
activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the
purpose of the due process clause to insure." Id. at 319.
11. The Judicial Council of California recommended in its 1969 report to the
Governor and the Legislature that the lawmakers enact a modern jurisdiction statute
attuned to the problems posed by an increasingly mobile society. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF
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guide to aid attorneys and courts in interpreting the statute
was issued by the California Judicial Council. The guide de-
tailed all modern instances in which courts had constitution-
ally exercised their judicial jurisdiction.'" The Council com-
ment recognized, however, that the sufficiency of a particular
nonresident's relationship to a forum state was a matter of
constitutional law on which the United States Supreme Court
had the final voice.13
The high court has, however, provided only two significant
interpretations of state courts' power to exercise in personam
jurisdiction under the broad "minimum contacts" test of
International Shoe. '4 In the first, McGee v. International Life
Insurance Co., '5 the Court held that California had jurisdiction
over a Texas corporation on a cause of action for breach of
contract where the corporation had solicited and delivered a
reinsured life insurance policy to a California resident." The
company contested the exercise of jurisdiction over it on the
grounds that it had never solicited or done any insurance busi-
ness in California apart from the one policy at issue. 7 In re-
sponse, Mr. Justice Black, writing for a unanimous Court, con-
cluded:
It is sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was
based on a contract which had substantial connection with
[California]. The contract was delivered in California, the
premiums were mailed from there and the insured was a
resident of that State when he died. It cannot be denied
that California had a manifest interest in providing effec-
tive means of redress for its residents when their insurers
refuse to pay their claims. . . .
CALIFORNIA, 1969 ANN. REP. TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 27 [hereinafter
cited as JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT]. The Council recommended the adoption of a
comprehensive long-arm statute which would enable California courts to exercise juris-
diction, without specific statute or decision by its courts, on any recognized basis ofjurisdiction established presently or in the future with due regard for constitutional
limitations. Id. at 33-34.
12. See id. at 27-28, 33-34, 69-91. The report included a summary of all the
modern bases of judicial jurisdiction governing both natural persons, corporations, and
unincorporated associations. Id. at 33. In approving the jurisdiction statute, the Senate
announced its intent to incorporate all these bases into the California statute. See
Report of the SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY on S.B. 503, reprinted in 2 J. CAL. SENATE
3161 (1969).
13. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 11, at 69.
14. See note 10 supra.
15. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
16. Id. at 221-22.
17. Id. at 222.
18. Id. at 223-24.
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McGee established a principle of limited jurisdiction
which permitted a state to constitutionally assert personal ju-
risdiction over a nonresident who had purposefully initiated
some liability producing activity within the forum state. This
jurisdiction was limited, however, to causes of action which
arose out of such acts.
In the second, Hanson v. Denckla, 9 the Court confronted
the issue of whether or not a Florida probate court could assert
in personam jurisdiction over the Delaware trustee of a trust
created by a Pennsylvania settlor, who died domiciled in Flor-
ida.2 The Court recognized that the testatrix had carried on a
considerable business correspondence with the Delaware trus-
tee which could be likened to the mailing of premiums in
McGee. Nevertheless, the court distinguished that case by
stating that the trustee had not performed any acts in Florida
that bore the same relationship to the trust agreement as the
insurance solicitation bore to the insurance agreement in
McGee."' Since the defendant's activity in Florida hadn't given
rise to a cause of action, the Court determined that it wouldn't
be fair or reasonable to expect the Delaware trustee to appear
and defend in Florida, unless the defendant had purposefully
availed itself of the protection of Florida law.2"
The Supreme Court did not delineate what types of acts
constituted "purposefully availing oneself of the privilege of
conducting activities within a forum," thereby leaving the reso-
lution of that question to the lower federal and state courts.
The California Supreme Court's resolution appeared in
Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court." There, the court
equated engaging in economic activity as a matter of commer-
cial actuality with Hanson's "purposeful availment" require-
ment 4 to support an assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident
manufacturer in a products liability action.
Although McGee and Hanson provided two new tests to
aid the courts in determining the reasonableness of asserting
personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, they did not
make clear what factors satisfied the requirement of reasona-
bleness in any given case. In Buckeye Boiler, the California
19. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
20. Id. at 238-39.
21. Id. at 252.
22. Id. at 253.
23. 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969).
24. Id. at 902, 458 P.2d at 64, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 120.
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Supreme Court ruled that the parties relative convenience in
engaging in a trial within this state, was a factor to be consid-
ered in determining the reasonableness of asserting jurisdic-
tion, once the defendant had the necessary contacts with the
forum. In upholding the exercise of limited jurisdiction the
supreme court stated:
Once it is established that the defendant has engaged
in activity of the requisite quality and nature in the forum
state and that the cause of action is sufficiently connected
with this activity, the propriety of assuming jurisdiction
'depends upon a balancing of the inconvenience to the de-
fendant in having to defend itself in the forum state
against both the interest of the plaintiff in suing locally
and the interrelated interest of the state in assuming juris-
diction .25
With these traditional jurisdictional principles in mind, it
becomes relevant to consider the circumstances under which
California courts have found the exercise of limited jurisdiction
reasonable.
A COMPARISON OF TORT AND CONTRACT CASES UNDER THE LONG-
ARM STATUTE: 1970-1975
In the absence of general jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant, a plaintiff may compel the defendant to appear in
a lawsuit before a California court only if he can show that the
cause of action arises out of or is substantially connected with
the nonresident's activities within the state."6 Since the generaljurisdiction tests of "extensive or wide-ranging"7 or
"continuous and systematic 28 activity are considerably more
demanding than the limited jurisdiction tests, a question arises
as to when California courts have placed a jurisdictional con-
troversy into the general or limited context. This question can
best be answered by contrasting the judicial response in juris-
dictional controversies arising in both tort and contract ac-
tions. This approach provides useful insight into how Califor-
nia courts have accommodated the varying interests of the
25. Id. at 899, 458 P.2d at 62, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
26. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Interna-
tional Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
27. See Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d at 898-99, 458 P.2d at
62, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
28. See Hanson v. Denckla, 342 U.S. at 447-48.
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state and litigants, when determining whether particular facts
warrant the exercise of general or limited jurisdiction.
Tort Actions
In Michigan National Bank v. Superior Court," the First
District Court of Appeal justified its assertion of limited juris-
diction over a Michigan bank on the grounds that the bank's
California contacts constituted the very acts from which liabil-
ity ensued. In this case, a California citizen had purchased a
used aircraft on installment from a California dealer." The
purchase was financed and secured by the Michigan National
Bank, which did business exclusively in Michigan. The plane
was repossessed by the bank and the purchaser sued the bank
and others for conversion."1 The bank moved to quash service
of the summons, the trial court denied the motion, and the
bank petitioned for mandamus.2 The court of appeal denied
the writ, reasoning that the Michigan bank's financing of the
purchase of a plane sold and harbored in California constituted
a substantial connection with the forum which supported the
exercise of limited jurisdiction.13 Further, the court found that
the position of the California purchaser was analogous to that
of the beneficiary in McGee, since the bank contract was deliv-
ered in California, the bank undertook the dealer-seller's obli-
gation under its mortgage in California, and the mortgage pay-
ments were to be remitted from California. 3'
Similarly, in Quattrone v. Superior Court,5 the court of
appeal upheld the exercise of limited jurisdiction over a Penn-
sylvania resident on a cause of action for fraud, notwithstand-
ing the fact that the defendant had never set foot in California.
Quattrone, the controller of a Pennsylvania subsidiary, was
accused of filing false financial statements in order to person-
ally benefit from a stock exchange program with a California
parent .3 The parent brought an action against Quattrone and
others alleging a conspiracy to defraud. He moved to quash
personal service in Pennsylvania on the grounds he had never
29. 23 Cal. App. 3d 1, 99 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1972).
30. Id. at 4, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 3, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
33. Id. at 6, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 826.
34. Id.
35. 44 Cal. App. 3d 296, 118 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1975).
36. Id. at 299, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 549.
[Vol. 17
LIMITED JURISDICTION
done any business, received any income, or solicited any clients
in California. 7 The trial court denied the motion and the defen-
dant appealed for a writ of mandate."8
In denying the writ, the court of appeal held that the exer-
cise of limited jurisdiction was reasonable when a defendant
intentionally caused effects in California by acts done else-
where and those effects concerned matters subject to special
regulation by this state. 9 The court found such an effect pro-
duced by Quattrone's falsifying of the parent's financial re-
cords which caused it to issue stock in violation of a permit
granted by the California Corporation Commissioner.'" This
permit violation was, in turn, a public offense under the Cali-
fornia Corporations Code."
Even though a cause of action has not directly arisen from
a nonresident defendant's purposeful activities in this state,
limited jurisdiction may still be exercised over him if it can be
shown that the cause of action is substantially related to the
defendant's California activities. Thus, in Threlkeld v.
Tucker,42 a Connecticut resident filed a number of lawsuits in
California against his former wife.43 The ex-wife counter-
claimed in one of these suits for malicious prosecution and
received a default judgment. When the husband did not satisfy
the judgment, she brought a successful diversity action upon
it in federal district court.4" The husband appealed contending
that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over him
because he had no contacts with California." Utilizing Califor-
nia's long-arm statute, in accordance with federal rules,47 the
Ninth Circuit upheld the exercise of limited jurisdiction since
the suit upon the judgment was "only one step removed from
37. Id.
38. Id. at 300, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 550.
39. Id. at 306, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 554. The court noted the existence of another
ground supporting the exercise of jurisdiction over Quattrone. By electing to partici-
pate in the stock program provided by the acquisition agreement, the nonresident
defendant enjoyed the benefit and protection of California law because the program
was approved by the California Corporation Commissioner only upon a showing that
it was fair and equitable to Crown's shareholders. Id. at 307, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
40. Id. at 307, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
41. Id. at 307, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
42. 196 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1023 (1974).
43. Id. at 1103.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1102-03.
47. Id. at 1103-1104.
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a diversity action upon a tort (malicious prosecution) commit-
ted by the nonresident in California, and it was closely related
to an elaborate course of forum-related activities carried on by
the defendant."4
Employing comparable reasoning, a California appellate
court, in Shoei Kako Co. v. Superior Court,4" upheld the exer-
cise of limited jurisdiction over a Japanese corporation in a
products liability action. In this case, a motorcycle rider, wear-
ing a particular type of safety helmet, was severely injured in
a collision with an automobile." The injured rider brought a
negligence action against the driver and all those who negli-
gently designed, manufactured, tested, repaired, sold, retailed,
wholesaled and distributed the safety helmet.' Shoei Kako
received a copy of the summons at its head office in Japan52
because it had assumed all the legal obligations of the helmet
manufacturer, D.S. Kagaku, after a merger between the two
companies.53 It moved to quash the summons on the grounds
that California lacked personal jurisdiction. 4 The trial court
denied the motion and Shoei Kako petitioned for a writ of
mandate seeking a review of the order.5
Although some inadmissable evidence indicated that D.S.
Kagaku had sold the helmet in question to a Japanese exporter
for delivery to California," the actual record revealed very little
evidence which indicated that it and Shoei Kako were engaged
in the distribution and sale of safety helmets in California.57
48. Id. at 1104.
49. 33 Cal. App. 3d 807, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1973).
50. Id. at 810, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
51. Id. at 810, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 404. Against the latter defendants, the plaintiff
also brought suit for breach of an implied warranty of fitness and on a theory of strict
liability. Id. at 810-11, 109 Cal. Rptr. 404.
52. Id. at 810, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
53. Id. at 811, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 813, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 405-06.
57. The record revealed that Philip K. Huff had executed a declaration stating
that prior to July 15, 1968 he had been doing business in California under the name
D.S. Kagaku Co., and that on that date he incorporated and conducted a business
under the name D.S. Safety Helmet Corporation. Further, respondent's attorney filed
an affidavit stating that on December 9, 1971, Huff, as vice-president of D.S. Safety
Helmet Corporation, gave him a business card bearing that legend with a Los Angeles
address for the corporation, and the further endorsement "D.S. Kagaku Co." with the
Tokyo address of that corporation. Additionally, an investigator for the plaintiff
submitted an affidavit stating that on January 13, 1973 Philip Huff was managing a
booth at a motorcycle and accessories trade show in Long Beach, California where he
[Vol. 17
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The appellate court conceded that the case supporting jurisdic-
tion was "shockingly incomplete," but reasoned that its suffi-
ciency must be viewed in light of Shoei Kako's failure to rebut
the evidence that was presented.58 Consequently, the court
upheld limited jurisdiction over Shoei Kako holding that the
totality of facts suggested that the merged corporation should
have reasonably anticipated that its safety helmets would be
resold in California. 9 The court concluded that Shoei Kako in
selling its helmets to Japanese exporters or American importers
had, in effect, purposefully availed itself of the California mar-
ketplace.'"
These cases stand for the proposition that to support the
assertion of limited jurisdiction in a tort case from 1970-1975,
California's appellate courts required that the cause of action
arise from the nonresident defendant's purposeful activities
within the state or be substantially related to them.
Contract Actions
In order to support an assumption of limited jurisdiction
in a contract case during this period, California's appellate
courts generally required that the cause of action arise out of
the defendant's physical economic activity within this state.
An illustration of this general requirement appeared in
Belmont Industries, Inc. v. Superior Court,6' where the Fifth
District Court of Appeal was forced to determine whether a
California drafting firm could obtain personal jurisdiction over
a Pennsylvania corporation, in an action to enforce payment
for drafting services. The services were performed in California
by Viking Drafting in accordance with a contract solicited by
Belmont over the telephone, negotiated through the mails, and
ultimately executed by Belmont in Pennsylvania.2 Though
Belmont had sent agents to California to discuss other jobs, no
representative of the Pennsylvania corporation came to Cali-
fornia to discuss the contract sued upon.63
Since the contract sued upon was negotiated entirely
was advertising and selling safety helmets manufactured by Shoei Kako Co. Id. at 814,
109 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 814-15, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
60. Id.
61. 31 Cal. App. 3d 281, 107 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1973).
62. Id. at 284, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
63. Id. at 284 n. 2, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 239 n. 2.
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through interstate communications and consummated outside
of California, the appellate court declined to consider whether
limited jurisdiction could be asserted over the nonresident cor-
poration. In denying general jurisdiction, the court reasoned:
Viking contends that its similar contracts with peti-
tioner in past years, as well as petitioner's contracts with
other California drafting firms and the occasional acts of
petitioner in sending employees to California to confer on
the progress of a contract, elevate petitioner's relationship
with California to a constitutionally sufficient level for the
exercise of jurisdiction. However, in evaluating petitioner's
activities we must look to the nature and quality of the
activity, rather than its quantity. . . . Irrespective of the
number of contracts, the substance of petitioner's activi-
ties within the state has been the same-purchase of serv-
ices from residents by contracts executed outside of the
state. The occasional act of sending an employee into the
state to expedite the services adds nothing to the relation-
ship between petitioner and the state. .... .4
Similarly, in Martin v. Detroit Lions, Inc., 5 the Fifth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal upheld an exercise of limited jurisdiction
on the grounds that the cause of action for breach of contract
arose from the defendant's physical economic activity within
California. A professional football player brought suit against
a Michigan corporation, which owned and operated a profes-
sional football team for profit, to recover his full salary for the
1970 season pursuant to the terms of an alleged agreement.66
The trial court granted the defendant's motion to quash service
of the summons and the plaintiff appealed. 7
The court of appeal reversed the trial court's order, holding
that where the defendant had scouted, recruited and signed the
employment contract in California and where its team played
games regularly in this state, the California court had jurisdic-
tion over the suit.68
Also during this period, if a nonresident contract defen-
dant's California contacts and activities were unrelated to the
cause of action, then the plaintiff was required to show that the
defendant had been doing a relatively large volume of business
64. Id. at 288 n. 4, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 241 n. 4 (citations omitted).
65. 32 Cal. App. 3d 472, 108 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1973).
66. Id. at 474, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
67. Id. at 475, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
68. Id.
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in this state on a regular basis before the appellate courts as-
serted general jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Second District
Court of Appeal in Vibration Isolation Products, Inc. v. Ameri-
can National Rubber Co., 9 an action involving breach of war-
ranty, held that $25,000 in gross sales to California customers
over a three year period by independent nonexclusive sales
representatives was not sufficient nonresident activity within
the state to support an assertion of general jurisdiction.'" On
the other hand, the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Ratcliffe
v. Pedersen,7' in a complaint sounding both in contract and
tort, held that general jurisdiction could be assumed over a
nonresident defendant who had sold more than 400 motorcycles
to a California distributor over a two year period, where these
sales represented his entire motorcycle business.7"
As the foregoing analysis of contract cases indicates, if the
nonresident defendant's activities are not supportive of limited
jurisdiction, the plaintiff will generally have great difficulty
meeting the rigorous requirements supporting general jurisdic-
tion.
Tort and Contract Actions Compared
A comparison of jurisdictional disputes in tort and con-
tract cases brought under California's long-arm statute during
this period reveals that the appellate courts accorded them
differing treatment. The courts asserted limited jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants in tort causes of action based on
fewer California contacts than they required in contract causes
of action.
In the intentional tort causes of action described in
Michigan National Bank73 and Quattrone,74 the assertion of
limited jurisdiction over the nonresident presented no diffi-
culty based on the general principles outlined in McGee.75
However, if the tort cause of action asserted against a nonresi-
dent defendant did not arise directly from his forum contacts,
then the California courts justified the assertion of limited ju-
risdiction based on a substantial connection between the plain-
69. 23 Cal. App. 3d 480, 100 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1972).
70. Id. at 482-84, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 270-71.
71. 51 Cal. App. 3d 89, 123 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1975).
72. Id. at 95, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
73. See text accompanying notes 29-34 supra.
74. See text accompanying notes 35-40 supra.
75. See text accompanying notes 15-18 supra.
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tiff's claim and the defendant's forum-related activity. Thus,
in Threlkeld,76 the Ninth Circuit upheld the exercise of limited
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant whose repeated Cali-
fornia lawsuits provided the basis for the plaintiff's cause of
action against him for malicious prosecution.77 Similarly, in
Shoei Kako,8 the court upheld the exercise of limited jurisdic-
tion over a nonresident defendant manufacturer whose product
was shown to have made its way to California and caused in-
jury. 79
In contract cases, however, appellate courts have seem-
ingly demanded a more direct relationship between the nonres-
ident's forum activity and the plaintiff's cause of action before
upholding the exercise of limited jurisdiction. Essentially, they
have required that a cause of action for breach of contract arise
out of or be substantially connected with a nonresident defen-
dant's physical economic activity within the state, although
such a showing is not constitutionally required. A comparison
of two breach of contract actions, Belmont Industries" and
McGee,"' illustrates that the California approach to limited
jurisdiction in contract cases is unduly restrictive.
In both Belmont Industries and McGee, the nonresident
corporations solicited the litigated contracts from outside this
state and conducted business with respect to those contracts
entirely through the mails or by telephone.82 The facts of the
two cases might be distinguished on the basis that the Texas
insurance company, by receiving premium payments from a
California resident,83 had enjoyed a direct economic benefit
from this state, while the defendant in Belmont Industries had
merely enjoyed the benefit of California based-technology.
However, the nonresident company in Belmont Industries ex-
pected an eventual gain from the project for which the drafting
services were performed. Thus, in essence, each nonresident
company received a benefit based on its dealings with Califor-
76. 496 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1974). See text accompanying notes 42-46 supra.
77. Id. at 1104.
78. 33 Cal. App. 3d 807, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1973). See text accompanying notes
49-66 supra.
79. Id. at 814-15, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
80. 31 Cal. App. 3d 281, 107 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1973). See text accompanying notes
67-70 supra.
81. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). See text accompanying notes 15-18 supra.
82. See 355 U.S. at 221-22; 31 Cal. App. 3d at 284, 288 n.4, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 238,
241 n.4.
83. 355 U.S. at 222.
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nia residents. 4 Though the facts in the two cases were compa-
rable, the results were not.
In McGee, the Supreme Court upheld the exercise of lim-
ited jurisdiction over the foreign insurer despite the absence of
any physical activity by it within California." Conversely, in
Belmont Industries the court of appeal denied the assertion of
limited jurisdiction over the nonresident company because it
had not engaged in any physical acts within California which
gave rise to a cause of action."
Thus, California's lower courts used different criteria when
determining the reasonableness of exercising limited jurisdic-
tion, depending on the nature of the claim presented. In tort
causes of action, the California courts held that a nonresident
defendant had satisfied the Hanson "purposeful availment 87
requirement by filing harassing lawsuits in this state,8 submit-
ting fraudulent financial statements to a California corporation
from outside this state,8" and selling products under circum-
stances such that the defendant should have known that his
product would be sold and used in California.'" In contract
causes of action, however, California's appellate courts re-
quired physical economic activity by the nonresident defen-
dant in California in connection with the contract sued upon
in spite of McGee."' If this requirement prevails it will become
increasingly difficult for California plaintiffs to enforce con-
tracts in this state as California businesses turn more and more
to dealing with distant firms entirely through the mails and by
telephonic communication. 2
In the wake of the differing treatments accorded the two
types of cases by the appellate courts, it is important to exam-
84. The cases should not be distinguished on the basis that in McGee the Califor-
nia court had obtained jurisdiction over the Texas insurance company under a special
statute, since that was only one factor in the Supreme Court's evaluation of the reason-
ableness of assuming jurisdiction over the nonresident insurer. Id. at 221 n.1.
85. Id. at 221-22.
86. 31 Cal. App. 3d at 288 n.4, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 241 n.4.
87. See text accompanying notes 19-24 supra.
88. See text accompanying notes 42-48 supra.
89. See text accompanying notes 35-41 supra.
90. See text accompanying notes 49-60 supra.
91. See text accompanying notes 61-72 supra.
92. As long ago as 1957 the United States Supreme Court in McGee v. Interna-
tional Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), observed: "Today many commercial transac-
tions touch two or more States and may involve parties separated by the full continent.
With this increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great increase in the
amount of business conducted by mail across state lines." Id. at 222-23.
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ine whether this pattern is present in recent California Su-
preme Court cases.
RECENT STATE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS UNDER THE LONG-ARM
STATUTE
For several years the only expression on the permissible
reach of California's long-arm statute came from the state's
appellate courts. Although they granted jurisdiction more
freely in certain tort actions, these courts did so based on the
rigorous traditional requirements. Then in 1976, the California
Supreme Court, in Cornelison v. Chaney,93 moved away from
traditional jurisdictional restrictions in a wrongful death ac-
tion. Contemporaneous with this expansion, the supreme court
declined to exercise limited jurisdiction in Sibley v. Superior
Court,9 an action involving a breach of a guaranty. Subse-
quent to these apparently conflicting decisions, the supreme
court expanded the concept of limited jurisdiction to its fur-
thest extent yet in a child support action, Kulko v. Superior
Court ."
In view of the disparate treatment accorded these differing
claims brought under the long-arm statute, a comparative
analysis of the policy considerations underlying each decision
must be undertaken to determine their impact on the jurisdic-
tional inquiry.
Cornelison v. Chaney
In Cornelison, the supreme court explored the traditional
requirements supporting the exercise of both limited and gen-
eral jurisdiction and found that neither were met. The defen-
dant was an independent Nebraska trucker who was licensed
to haul freight in California. 8 In each of the seven years preced-
ing the action, he made about 20 trips to California with loads
averaging $20,000 in value. 7 While enroute to California with
a load, he collided with a car just south of Las Vegas near the
California-Nevada border. 8 The plaintiff's husband was killed
in the accident and she sued the trucker for wrongful death
93. 16 Cal. 3d 143, 545 P.2d 264, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1976).
94. 16 Cal. 3d 442, 546 P.2d 322, 128 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1976).
95. 19 Cal. 3d 514, 564 P.2d 353, 138 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1977).
96. 16 Cal. 3d at 147, 545 P.2d at 266, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 354.
97. Id. at 146-47, 545 P.2d at 266, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 354.
98. Id. at 146-47, 545 P.2d at 265, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
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based upon his negligent driving. The defendant was served by
mail in Nebraska and he moved to quash the summons.9 The
trial court granted the motion and the plaintiff appealed.10
In considering the nonresident's California contacts, the
supreme court initially determined that they were "not so sub-
stantial or wide-ranging as to justify general jurisdiction over
him." 1" Additionally, the court found that they were not con-
nected to the cause of action in the direct manner which had
justified the assertion of jurisdiction in McGee.' °2 The court,
however, continued the jurisdictional inquiry because it could
not "overlook the fact that [the] defendant's contacts with
California, although insufficient to justify general jurisdiction
over him, are far more extensive than those of the defendant
in McGee."'"3 It held that a "substantial nexus" was demon-
strated between the plaintiff's cause of action and defendant's
forum related activities which justified an assertion of limited
jurisdiction.'"' Even though the accident occurred in Nevada,
this nexus was supplied by the fact that the accident occurred
close to the California border while the defendant was on his
way there to further his commercial activities. 5
Having found that jurisdiction could be exercised, the
Cornelison court then considered whether California was the
proper forum. The court balanced the relative burdens to the
parties and concluded that it was. 06 The court noted that the
plaintiff, a witness to the accident, was a California resident
whose proof of damages rested in California where her husband
earned his living.'"7 Moreover, the court observed that a neces-
sary incident to the defendant's multi-state trucking operation
was the forseeability of having to defend lawsuits in distant
forums. 018
Justice Clark, in his dissent, criticized the majority for
failing to show the requisite connection between the cause of
action at issue and the defendant's California activities. He
reasoned that the only conceivable connection between the
99. Id. at 146, 545 P.2d at 265, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 148, 545 P.2d at 267, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
102. Id. at 149-50, 545 P.2d at 268, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
103. Id. at 150, 545 P.2d at 268, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
104. Id. at 149, 545 P.2d at 268, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
105. Id. at 149, 545 P.2d at 267-68, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 355-56.
106. Id. at 152, 545 P.2d at 269, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
107. Id. at 151, 545 P.2d at 269, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
108. Id.
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cause of action and the defendant's forum-related activity was
that the defendant was rolling towards California and the
plaintiff away from it when the accident occurred. 09 Although
conceding that arguably the accident "arose" from the defen-
dant's pursuit of business activity in this state, he found no
authority suggesting that such a tenuous connection would
support the assertion of in personam jurisdiction."' In fact, he
pointed out that "every decision cited by the majority upheld
limited jurisdiction only where the cause of action arose from
or was substantially related to defendant's activity within the
forum state itself.""' Since every event relevant to plaintiff's
cause of action occurred in Nevada, Clark concluded that the
prevailing rule required the denial of jurisdiction.
Clark also criticized the majority for concluding that Cali-
fornia was the proper forum. He contended that even assuming
the constitutionality of maintaining the action in California,
the defendant's burden in litigating in California was far
greater than the plaintiff's burden in litigating in Nevada.
First, he noted that all the witnesses except for the plaintiff
herself were in Nevada." ' Second, he observed that the police
and medical reports as well as physical evidence were in that
state."' Accordingly, Clark argued that not only would the de-
fendant be forced to incur heavy litigation expenses in prepar-
ing his case since the bulk of evidence was outside the forum
state, but he might be practically precluded from securing all
the witnesses necessary for his defense .in California."' Clark
also pointed out that the plaintiff had easy access to the Ne-
vada forum and would not be greatly inconvenienced in bring-
ing her action there. 5
Cornelison represents a flexible approach to the resolution
of jurisdictional disputes based upon the interplay of four
essential considerations-a continuous course of conduct
within the forum state, a sufficient nexus between the cause of
action and that conduct, matters of convenience, and the
state's interests-with the strength of one factor compensating
for the weakness of another. Although the Cornelison approach
109. Id. at 153, 545 P.2d at 270, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 154, 545 P.2d at 270, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 154, 545 P.2d at 271, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
115. Id.
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marks a radical departure from traditional jurisdictional prin-
ciples, it will only be available in ordinary negligence and
wrongful death actions wherein a tortious act occurring outside
the state may be conceptually connected with the nonresident
defendant's forum-state activity."' It seems unlikely that this
conceptual connection would be satisfied by a nonresident de-
fendant who failed to perform on a contract in a sister state
pursuant to an agreement entered into in California. The con-
tract defendant, in breaching such a contract, is not intent
upon furthering his commercial activities in this state. Thus,
the Cornelison approach to the acquisition of limited jurisdic-
tion based on a liability-producing act outside California
would probably be unavailable to the contract plaintiff.
Sibley v. Superior Court
Sibley was decided by the California Supreme Court one
month after Cornelison. In that case, a limited partnership had
been formed in California by Carlsberg Mobile Home Proper-
ties, a California corporation, and Sunrise Lakes, Inc., a Geor-
gia corporation, to operate two mobile home parks in Geor-
gia."' Under the terms of the partnership agreement, Carlsberg
was to contribute its holdings of land in Georgia"8 and Sunrise
was to manage the business as the general partner,"' while
making monthly payments to Carlsberg in California.'2" Sibley,
a Florida resident, personally guaranteed the obligation of Sun-
rise to make the payments.' When Sunrise defaulted on its
payments, Carlsberg tried to collect from Sibley who refused
to pay. As a result, Carlsberg brought an action in California
116. The Cornelison court's finding of a "substantial nexus" between the cause
of action and the defendant's forum-related activities was premised on two considera-
tions. First, the defendant's activities within California consisted primarily of hauling
freight in and out of this state. The driving of the defendant's truck, the very activity
which gave rise to the cause of action, was "the essential basis of defendant's contacts
with this state." Id. at 149, 545 P.2d at 268, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 356. Secondly, the
accident occurred not far from the California border, while the defendant was bound
for this state to deliver goods to a local manufacturer. Id. Thus, at the time the
defendant's liability-producing act occurred he was engaged in furthering his commer-
cial activities in California by hauling freight into this state. Hence a logical connec-
tion could be made betwden the cause of action and the defendant's economic activities
in California.
117. 16 Cal. 3d at 444, 546 P.2d at 323, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
118. Id. at 448, 546 P.2d at 326, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
119. Id. at 444, 546 P.2d at 323, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
120. Id. at 444, 546 P.2d at 323-24, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 35-36.
121. Id. at 444, 546 P.2d at 324, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
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against Sunrise, alleging breach of the partnership agreement,
and against Sibley, for breach of the guaranty agreement.' 2
The trial court denied Sibley's motion to quash service of the
summons for lack of personal jurisdiction and the court of ap-
peal affirmed.' The defendant then petitioned the California
Supreme Court for a writ of mandate seeking to set aside the
trial court's order denying the motion to quash.'
Carlsberg argued that Sibley's guaranty executed in Flor-
ida induced it to enter the limited partnership."' It pointed out
that the signing of the guaranty in Florida was intended to and
did cause an effect in California, thereby giving rise to a recog-
nized basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent defendant. " Further, Carlsberg emphasized that since
the performance guaranteed was the payment of money to a
California partnership, Sibley could have anticipated that his
failure to perform would have an effect in California.'"
The supreme court conceded that in breaching his guar-
anty, Sibley had caused an "effect" in this state by an act done
elsewhere. However, it held that the imposition of jurisdiction
would be unreasonable since the record failed to disclose that
Sibley had purposefully availed himself of either the privilege
of conducting business in California or the benefits and protec-
tions of its laws.' 8 The court observed that even if Sibley had
reasonably foreseen that his breach would have some impact
in this state, Carlsberg had not assumed any obligations to
him which he could have had enforced in California.'29 It also
observed that while other parties involved in the suit had
considerable contacts with California, their purposes could
not be imputed to Sibley so as to support personal jurisdiction
over him.'"
The two dissenting justices found the requisite minimum
contacts present to assert personal jurisdiction. Justice Mosk,
author of the dissent, premised his argument on the fact that
the guaranty was negotiated in and delivered to Carlsberg in
122. Id.
123. Id. at 444-45, 450, 546 P.2d at 324, 327, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 36, 39.
124. Id. at 445, 546 P.2d at 324, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
125. Id. at 446, 546 P.2d at 325, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
126. Id. at 445-46, 546 P.2d at 324-25, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 36-37.
127. Id. at 446, 546 P.2d at 325, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
128. Id. at 447, 546 P.2d at 325, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 447-48, 546 P.2d at 326, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
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California, and contemplated payments there."3 ' He further
emphasized that Carlsberg would not have signed the limited
partnership agreement in California without Sibley's guaran-
tee."' He concluded that "[T]his is precisely the type of act,
originally performed elsewhere but causing a specific effect in
California, contemplated by Quattrone v. Superior Court."'33
Justice Mosk also observed that California was the convenient
and proper forum for hearing the action because Carlsberg was
formed in California and maintained its only place of business
there, while the limited partnership involved in the litigation
was created in California under its Corporations Code. 3'
Kulko v. Superior Court
In Kulko, the California Supreme Court once again con-
fronted the question of whether it was reasonable to assume
limited jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who caused
"effects" in California by acts done outside the state. Here, the
parents of Ilsa and Darwin Kulko, after obtaining a divorce in
Haiti, agreed that the children would reside with their father
in New York during the school year and with their mother in
San Francisco during vacation periods. 3 ' The father agreed to
pay the mother child support during these California vacation
periods. 3'
In 1973, on the eve of her departure to spend Christmas
vacation with her mother, Ilsa told her father that she wanted
to stay with her mother in California permanently.'37 The fa-
ther purchased a one-way plane ticket to California for her and
she subsequently lived with her mother during the school year
and her father during vacations.'38
In January of 1976, without his father's knowledge, Darwin
phoned his mother from New York and asked if he could come
to California to live with her. 3 She immediately sent him an
airplane ticket to San Francisco and he joined his sister."10
131. Id. at 450, 546 P.2d at 327, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 449, 546 P.2d at 327, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
135. Id. at 519, 564 P.2d at 355, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 519-20, 564 P.2d at 355, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
138. Id. at 520, 564 P.2d at 355, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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Three weeks later Mrs. Kulko filed suit in a California court
to establish the Haitian divorce as a California judgment, to
gain permanent custody of the children, and to receive in-
creased child support.'
The father was served with summons by mail and made a
special appearance in California moving to quash the service
for lack of personal jurisdiction."' The trial court denied the
motion and the defendant filed a writ of mandate with the
California Supreme Court."'
The court began by noting that the nonresident father's
act of sending his daughter into California to live with her
mother caused an "effect" in this state, but recognized that the
exercise of jurisdiction based upon such conduct must meet the
tests of reasonableness outlined in International Shoe and
Hanson. "I Thus, the court reasoned the record must show that
the nonresident "purposefully availed himself of the privilege
of conducting business in California or of the benefits and pro-
tections of California laws. . .or anticipated that he would de-
rive any economic benefit as a result of his act outside of Cali-
fornia."1
In applying the foregoing criteria to an action for increased
child support, the court observed, without citing supporting
authority, that "probably no parental act more fully invokes
the benefits and protections of California law than that by
which a parent permits his minor child to live in California.
The parent thereby avails himself of the total panoply of the
state's laws, institutions and resources ... "I"
In contrast to the supreme court's position, the public poli-
cies encouraging the payment of child support and cooperation
between parents in abiding by visitation agreements had re-
cently led two courts of appeal to refuse personal jurisdiction
over nonresident fathers. In Titus v. Superior Court, "I the
court held that merely sending children into California for vis-
its with their mother in accordance with a written custody
agreement did not subject a nonresident father to California
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 521, 564 P.2d at 356, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
145. Id. at 521-22, 564 P.2d at 356, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 5689.
146. Id. at 522, 564 P.2d at 356, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
147. 23 Cal. App. 3d 792, 100 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1972), construed in Kulko v. Supe-
rior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 514, 522-23, 564 P.2d 353, 138 Cal. Rptr. 586.
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jurisdiction.'45 Similarly, in Judd v. Superior Court, 4 the court
concluded that it was neither fair nor reasonable to hold that
California acquired jurisdiction over a nonresident father
merely because he sent support payments to California, com-
municated with his children by mail or telephone and visited
them there.150
The supreme court acknowledged that standing alone, Mr.
Kulko's act in temporarily sending his daughter to California
in accordance with the separation agreement would not sup-
port the assertion of jurisdiction.'' However, the court noted
that, unlike Titus, the defendant later sent his daughter here
for permanent residence.'15 This distinguishing feature led the
court to conclude that California had acquired personal juris-
diction over the defendant. The court reasoned that by actively
consenting to Ilsa's living in California on a permanent basis,
the defendant purposely availed himself of California's laws for
her care and protection. '53
In his dissent, Justice Richardson stressed the Sibley re-
quirement that the causing of an "effect" in California must
be designed to "purposefully avail oneself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of the forum's laws."' 54 He argued that
Petitioner may have purchased Ilsa's air passage to Cali-
fornia, but my reading of the record indicates no purpose-
ful conduct by him which can reasonably be said to invoke
the benefits and protections of California laws. At best,
petitioner passively acquiesced in his teenaged daughter's
unilateral decision to live in California.' ' 55
Justice Richardson concluded by warning that, "the rule
148. Id. at 803, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
149. 60 Cal. App. 3d 38, 131 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1976), construed in Kulko v. Superior
Court, 19 Cal. 3d 514, 523-24, 564 P.2d 353, 138 Cal. Rptr. 586.
150. Id. at 45, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 249-250.
151. 19 Cal. 3d at 524, 564 P.2d at 358, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
152. Id.
153. The court majority added that the defendant had derived an immediate
economic benefit by allowing Ilsa to live with her mother throughout the school year
since he was no longer liable for the child's support for that period. Id. at 524-25, 564
P.2d at 358, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
154. Id. at 527, 564 P.2d at 359, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 592.
155. Id. Justice Richardson also argued that even if the nonresident father's acts
with respect to his daughter could be rationalized as "purposeful conduct," there was
no conceivable basis on which to support in personam jurisdiction over him with
respect to Darwin. Richardson pointed out that the father "neither knew of, nor lifted
a finger to assist, Darwin's flight to California." Id. at 528, 564 P.2d at 360, 128 Cal.
Rptr. at 593.
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announced by the majority may encourage a divorced parent
such as petitioner to forbid or physically prevent his or her
children from visiting a California parent, lest personal juris-
diction be thereby conferred over the nonresident parent.' 156
Policy Considerations Underlying the Different Outcomes
The California Supreme Court liberally construed the con-
cept of limited jurisdiction in order to provide a local forum for
California residents in wrongful death and child support ac-
tions, but strictly construed traditional jurisdictional princi-
ples to deny it in a breach of a guaranty action. Thus, the state
high court reaffirmed the trend established by the appellate
courts that certain types of plaintiffs will be required to show
fewer nonresident contacts related to their cause of action to
support the assertion of limited jurisdiction. While the courts
themselves have rarely articulated the policy reasons behind
their jurisdictional decisions, the logical explanation for the
divergent treatment accorded tort and child support claims as
opposed to those in contract lies in the different substantive
interests at stake in those controversies.
The willingness of the Cornelison court to break a new
path in jurisdictional law by holding a nonresident defendant
subject to limited jurisdiction on a cause of action arising from
an accident occurring in Nevada was prompted, in part, by
California's interest in providing one of its residents with a
local forum.157 Although the supreme court failed to expound
this interest in Cornelison, it has long recognized California's
interest in insuring that severely injured California residents
are provided with a local forum.'58 One basic reason for this
position is that tort victims may be physically or financially
incapable of litigating in another state.'59 Additionally, if the
plaintiff is compelled to travel to a foreign state to sue, his
counsel may be disadvantaged due to lack of familiarity with
the foreign procedural and substantive law.8" Finally, if the
claim is not brought in the foreign state, or the plaintiff loses
or receives an inadequate judgment, then the plaintiff's
156. Id. at 528, 564 P.2d at 360, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
157. 16 Cal. 3d at 151, 545 P.2d at 269, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
158. See, e.g., Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d
57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969).
159. Id. at 906, 458 P.2d at 67, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
160. See also Carman, Another Slant ... Home Court Advantage, 52 CAL. ST.
B.J. 32 (1977).
[Vol. 17
LIMITED JURISDICTION
home state may have to bear the expense of caring for the in-
jured or his or her *spouse through disability insurance, un-
employment insurance and other forms of tax-funded relief
assistance. 6'
In Sibley, in spite of the fact that the cause of action arose
out of the defendant's purposeful forum-state "contacts," the
supreme court refused to uphold limited jurisdiction on the
ground that the defendant was a gratuitous guarantor who had
not satisfied the Hanson "purposeful availment" requirement.
Though the court did not articulate the policy reasons for its
decision, it was apparently swayed by the economic interests
at stake in the dispute. In Harkness Co., Inc. v. Amezcua, "2 an
action to recover for nonpayment of a promissory note, eco-
nomic interests persuaded the Fifth District Court of Appeal
to deny the assertion of limited jurisdiction over a Mexican
citizen. The court held that limited jurisdiction could not be
exercised where the defendant had no purposeful contacts with
the forum state apart from the agreement to make payments
on the note to a California resident and some telephone calls
to California concerning performance of the contract.' The
court reasoned that the assumption of jurisdiction on these
facts could adversely affect the free flow of interstate commerce
and, hence, the best economic interests of California.' Simi-
larly, if the supreme court in Sibley, had held that a nonresi-
dent subjected himself to the jurisdiction of California courts
by merely gratuitously guarantying the financial obligation of
another, the free flow of commerce and trade into and from
this state would have been adversely affected. If a gratuitous
guarantor knew that he would have to travel to a distant forum
to defend an action on his guaranty, he might be discouraged
from guarantying an obligation to be performed by or for Cali-
fornia businesses16 5
161. See generally Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114
Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974); Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d
57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969).
162. 60 Cal. App. 3d 687, 131 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1976).
163. Id. at 689-90, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 668-69.
164. Id. at 694, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 671-72.
165. See also Belmont Indus., Inc. v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. App. 3d 281 at 289,
107 Cal. Rptr. at 242, where the court of appeal stated that a compelling reason against
the assumption of jurisdiction by California over the foreign corporation was the ad-
verse effect such an action would have upon the free flow of commerce into and out of
California. The court cited the following persuasive language of the Utah Supreme
Court in Conn. v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 254, 342 P.2d 871, 874-75 (1959):
"Brief reflection will bring to mind difficulties to be encountered if the ordering
of merchandise in a foreign state by mail and taking delivery through a designated
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Sibley also reflects a basic principle of contract law that
courts should not remake a contract for the parties by incorpo-
rating new obligations in it. ' Since Carlsberg failed to include
a forum-selection clause, whereby suit on the guaranty could
be brought only in California, the court would not compel Sib-
ley to appear in California without his having purposefully
invoked the benefits and protections accorded by this state's
laws.
In Kulko, the California Supreme Court again neglected to
furnish any policy reasons in support of its assertion of limited
jurisdiction. On a theoretical level, however, the policy reasons
underlying a claim for increased child support are substantially
similar to those underlying an ordinary personal injury or
wrongful death action. The plaintiff's home state has a compel-
ling interest in insuring that the plaintiff be awarded the full
financial support she seeks lest she and her minor children
become a burden upon the state's taxpayers.'67
When the policy considerations underlying tort and con-
tract claims are contrasted, it is evident that the state has a
more compelling interest in providing a tort victim with a local
forum than in providing a contract victim with one. In tort
actions, the state has an interest in providing a forum to assure
full and adequate compensation for injured plaintiffs and de-
terring wrongful conduct upon California citizens.'6 s On the
other hand, contracting parties are less in need of a local forum
since they have presumably entered into their agreement freely
and voluntarily with ample opportunity to weigh the risks of a
carrier, whether private or common, is to be deemed "doing business" in a foreign
state, which will draw one into the orbit of the jurisdiction of its courts. This would
for practical purposes obliterate any protection one might have from being compelled
to go to a foreign jurisdiction to defend a lawsuit. A person contemplating business in
another state would have only two alternatives: either subject himself to the jurisdic-
tion of the foreign court if any dispute arises, or refrain from doing such business."
166. See, e.g., Lyon v. Goss, 19 Cal. 2d 659, 123 P.2d 11, 82 Cal. Rptr. 558 (1942);
Culbertson v. Cizek, 225 Cal. App. 2d 451, 37 Cal. Rptr. 548 (1964); Taliaferro v.
Taliaferro, 125 Cal. App. 2d 419, 270 P.2d 1036, 89 Cal. Rptr. 198 (1954).
167. See note 175 supra.
168. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLicr OF LAws § 36, Comment c (1971), cited
in JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 11, at 78, recognizes that:
A state has a special interest in exercising judicial jurisdiction over
those who commit torts within its territory. This is because torts involve
wrongful conduct which a state seeks to deter, and against which it at-
tempts to afford protection, by providing that a tortfeasor shall be liable
for damages which are the proximate result of his tort.
See generally Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 106 (1974).
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suit being brought on the contract.' Accordingly, the princi-
ples of fairness and reasonableness embodied in the concept of
due process indicate that a nonresident defendant should be
less entitled to urge a denial of limited jurisdiction in the inten-
tional tort or negligence situation and more entitled to urge
such a denial in the contract situation.' 70
Conceding that policy considerations support California's
continued adherence to the differing treatment of tort and con-
tract cases in jurisdictional disputes, the question then be-
comes will this approach, as applied, withstand constitutional
attack.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CALIFORNIA'S APPROACH
While the flexible path to jurisdictional resolution,
prompted by the passage of an expansive long-arm statute, has
allowed the California judiciary to accommodate the plain-
tiff's needs and the state's policy interests at the same time,
due process of law demands fairness and justice for nonresident
defendants whose property is subjected to potential depriva-
tion when personal jurisdiction is assumed. These competing
concerns dictate that when California courts rely on the
Cornelison approach to assert limited jurisdiction, they bal-
ance that decision's essential factors-a continuous course of
forum-state conduct, a substantial nexus between the cause of
169. See note 166 supra.
170. Some commentators have suggested that courts should require a lesser
quantum of a nonresident defendant's contacts related to the cause of action to uphold
limited jurisdiction in a tort action than in a contract action because of policy factors
favoring the tort claimant. See Carrington & Martin, Substantive Interests and the
Jurisdiction of State Courts, 66 MicH. L. REv. 227 (1969), where the authors observed
that,
within the sphere of compensatory tort litigation, plaintiffs who appear
to have suffered bodily injury are generally somewhat more likely to
succeed in invoking the jurisdictional long-arm than those whose inter-
ests are wholly economic, and that within these categories the tangibility
of the alleged harms may be a factor in influencing the judgment....
Thus, the supplier of potentially harmful goods may be viewed as under-
taking a special responsibility for the welfare of the consumers which
makes it peculiarly inappropriate for him to resist the moral claim of the
state when it seeks to assert power over him. This undertaking is less
relevant when the same supplier is engaged in a warranty dispute over
the quality of delivered goods with a commerical buyer who was in a
position to bargain for a local forum if he regarded the risk of distant
litigation as a significant aspect of his contract relation; in such a dispute,
the supplier is in a stronger position to resist the use of the long-arm on
the basis of attenuated contacts.
Id. at 232.
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action and that conduct, the convenience considerations and
the state's interest in maintaining the action-to achieve sub-
stantial justice for the nonresident and local parties.' 7 ' Thus,
where the nexus between the cause of action and the defen-
dant's forum activity is somewhat weak, extensive commercial
activities on the part of the defendant, a strong state interest
in assuming jurisdiction and the relative convenience of the
California forum should be demonstrated before limited juris-
diction is upheld. If the interests disfavoring as well as favor-
ing the imposition of limited jurisdiction are accorded legiti-
mate consideration in the Cornelison balancing process, then
Cornelison will not prove to be an undue extension of state
jurisdictional powers.
However, in its most recent jurisdictional decision in
Kulko, the California Supreme Court passed a decision that
might unduly extend the state's jurisdictional powers. By ob-
serving that no parental act more fully invokes the benefits and
protections of a forum's laws than that of sending one's minor
child into the forum state to live with a separated parent, the
Kulko court misinterpreted the plain meaning of Hanson's
"purposeful availment" requirement. The Supreme Court in
Hanson seemed to want to ensure fairness for nonresident de-
fendants by making them subject to a forum's jurisdiction only
when they had purposefully engaged in some forum-related
activity, resulting in the assumption of legal obligations by and
towards them which they could seek to enforce or defend under
the forum's laws.'72 Assuming arguendo that the nonresident
father's "purposeful" act of sending his daughter to California
171. The United States Supreme Court has recently reasserted the importance
of focusing the jurisdictional inquiry upon the relationship among the nonresident
defendant, the forum state, and the underlying cause of action. See Shaffer v. Heitner,
45 U.S.L.W. 4853 (June 24, 1977) (quasi-in-rem jurisdiction).
In Shaffer, the Court reasoned that all assertions of state court jurisdiction must
be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny.
Id. at 4854. In so ruling, the Court reaffirmed the fairness concept stemming from the
due process clause that "a state may not make binding a judgment ... against an
individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties or rela-
tions." Id.
172. The rationale behind the Hanson "purposeful availment" requirement, see
text accompanying notes 19-24 supra, was drawn from the following passage in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 326 (1945):
[The activities carried on in behalf of the appellant] resulted in a large
volume of business, in the course of which appellant received the benefits
and protections of the laws of the [forum] state, including the right to
resort to the courts for the enforcement of its rights. The obligation which
is here sued upon arose out of those very activities.
LIMITED JURISDICTION
was designed to avail the father of the benefits and protections
of California law, the only direct legal benefit he received by
such an act was the opportunity to recover damages for per-
sonal injuries and wrongful death inflicted upon his daughter
in California.'73 It seems unreasonable to assume that the non-
resident father contemplated such an eventuality when he sent
his daughter to stay permanently in California. Hence, the
nonresident father could not reasonably be said to have satis-
fied the Hanson "purposeful availment" requirement in its
ordinary sense.
Moreover, the Kulko court stretched the facts of the case
by finding that the nonresident father's acquiescence in his
daughter's unilateral decision to go to California and his pur-
chase of a one-way airplane ticket in recognition of her desire
constituted "purposeful" conduct on his part. Whereas the
supreme court was careful to point out in Sibley that the con-
duct of others could not be imputed to the defendant guarantor
so as to support limited jurisdiction over him,'74 limited juris-
diction over Kulko could only be justified by imputing to him
the purposeful conduct of his daughter.
The California approach to limited jurisdiction appears to
comport with the due process demands of the Constitution,
when it accommodates, as in Cornelison, the needs of all the
parties. However, when the approach fails to so accommodate
the parties, as in Kulko, it would seem to be constitutionally
deficient, since undue hardship can result to the nonresident
defendant.
CONCLUSION
While the due process concept is the servant of substantive
interests, it demands considerations of fairness towards nonres-
ident defendants. If the California judiciary is to properly con-
trol the expansive jurisdictional powers inherent in its elastic
long-arm statute, it must exercise balanced judgment so that
the private interests and needs of all litigants as well as those
of the forum state are met.'75 The costs to the plaintiff and the
173. Parents have a statutory right of action to recover from a third person whose
wrongful act or negligence has resulted in injuries or death to their child. A father's
right to recover for such injuries or death is not affected by an award of permanent
custody to the mother. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 376-377 (West 1973).
It can be argued that the father received the indirect benefit of having his daughter
protected by California's laws. See text accompanying notes 146-153 supra.
174. 16 Cal. 3d at 447-48, 545 P.2d at 326, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
175. See note 171 supra.
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state of foregoing an assertion of limited jurisdiction must be
fairly measured against the risks of subjecting the nonresident
defendant to an unfair hearing. To accomplish this task, the
plaintiff must first establish that the wrong allegedly commit-
ted by the nonresident either arose directly out of his California
contacts or was rationally and substantially related to a contin-
uous course of forum-related activity. After this showing, if the
nonresident defendant cannot demonstrate that his inconveni-
ence in defending a lawsuit in California would be significantly
greater than the countervailing interests of the plaintiff and the
state in compelling him to appear before a California tribunal,
then limited jurisdiction may be constitutionally exercised.
Richmond Martin Flatland
